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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first impression identified by 
federal court of appeals opinions announced between February 21, 2012 and August 28, 2012. 
This collection, written by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the issue, not a comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to 
be exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 9 SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] 
(2012). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers and 
Participating Employers v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 695 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether an employer’s failure to keep sufficient records, as required 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1), triggers a burden-shifting paradigm in assessing claims 
made by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-protected benefit plans 
seeking to enforce remittance requirements.  Id. at 9. 
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that the 6th, 9th, and 11th circuits “have 
concluded that an employer’s failure to keep adequate records . . . may trigger burden-
shifting.”  Id.  The court emphasized, however, that “such burden-shifting is not 
automatic,” and that the claimant must show, in addition to inadequate employer records, 
that “some employees performed covered work that was not reported to the benefit plan.”  
Id.  When both showings have been made, “the presumption is that the employer is liable 
for all hours potentially representing covered work.”  Id. at 10.  This “burden-shifting 
paradigm,” the court noted, prevents employers from evading “responsibility for benefit 
remittances by the simple expedient of failing to keep records that the law requires.”  Id.   
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CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that “an employer’s failure to keep adequate 
records as required by section 1059(a)(1)” triggers burden-shifting only when claimants 
also show that “some employees performed covered work that was not reported to the 
benefit plan.”  Id. at 9. 
 
Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether a homeowner “has standing to challenge the assignment of 
her [residential] mortgage—an assignment to which she is not a party and of which she is 
not a third-party beneficiary”—from a Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
(“MERS”) member to a third-party foreclosing mortgagee.  Id. at 289.   
 ANALYSIS:  The 1st Circuit first noted that where a plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing standing, that burden requires a showing of injury, causation, and 
redressability.  Id.  The court noted that foreclosure of the plaintiff's home mostly 
satisfied the first two elements by virtue of the harm it caused plaintiff and the relation of 
that harm to the third-party’s assigned right to foreclose.  Id.  As for redressability, the 
court observed that “a determination that [defendant-mortgagee] lacked the authority to 
foreclose would set the stage for redressing the plaintiff’s claimed injury.”  Id. at 290.  
The 1st Circuit next determined that the plaintiff also had prudential standing even 
though she was a mortgagor who was neither a party to, nor a third-party beneficiary of, 
the assignment.  Id.  Even though “it is true that a nonparty who does not benefit from a 
contract generally lacks [prudential] standing to assert rights under that contract,” the 
court drew a distinction here.  Id.  First, the court reasoned that “a Massachusetts 
mortgagor has a legally cognizable right under state law to ensure that any attempted 
foreclosure on her home is conducted lawfully.”  Id.  Second, as an equity concern, the 
court noted that “where (as here) a mortgage contains a power of sale, [state] law permits 
foreclosure without prior judicial authorization.”  Id.  Thus, the 1st Circuit reasoned that 
if a mortgagor could not challenge an assignment as a defense against foreclosure 
because she did not have standing to sue, then that mortgagor “would be deprived of a 
means to assert her legal protections.”  Id.  
 CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit narrowly held that “a mortgagor has standing to 
challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her home [as being invalid as opposed to 
merely being voidable] to the extent that such a challenge is necessary to contest a 
foreclosing entity's status qua mortgagee.”  Id. at 291.  
 
Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.  2012)  
QUESTION:  Whether overtime pay should be included in an award of back-pay 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  Id. at 5. 
ANALYSIS:   “The FMLA provides than an employee may recover “any wages, 
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost . . . by reason of the 
violation.”  Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that 
overtime “certainly falls into the category of other compensation,” because back-pay 
awards often included payments for overtime that an employee could have earned if the 
employer did not violate employment laws.  Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that “an award of back-pay under the FMLA 
properly included overtime compensation.”  Id. at 11. 
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United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012)1 
QUESTION:  Whether admission of evidence created in the regular course of 
business violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  Id. at *41.     
ANALYSIS:  The 1st Circuit noted that the threshold question in every evidentiary 
challenge under the Confrontation Clause is whether the evidentiary statement is 
testimonial.  Id. at *37.  The court reasoned that statements are testimonial when an 
objective witness would reasonably believe that the statement would be used at a later 
trial.  Id. at *38.  It clarified that some statements—such as business records or public 
records—are not testimonial.  Id.  The 1st Circuit further reasoned that although 
“[d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial 
despite their hearsay status, this would not be so if the regularly conducted business 
activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.”  Id. at *40 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Finally, courts must consider whether evidence admitted in violation of 
the Confrontation Clause caused harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at *76.         
CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that hearsay statements that “(1) did not exist 
before criminal activity was discovered; (2) stated conclusions (though perhaps obvious 
ones) about the meaning of underlying data; (3) were created for the express purpose of 
reporting criminal activity and identifying the perpetrator of that activity; and (4) were 
reported to a government-funded entity that serves as a conduit for passing information to 
law enforcement” may not be introduced as evidence without confrontation of the 
authors.  Id. at *81–82. 
 
United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION  ONE:  “[W]hether there is a First Amendment right of public access to 
Rule 17(c) subpoenas.”  Id. at 53. 
 ANALYSIS:  The 1st Circuit applied the two prong test established by the Supreme 
Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, which considers “whether [the 
documents] have historically been open to the press and general public and whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process 
in question.”  Id. at 53–54 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Addressing the first prong, 
the court explained that “discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private 
process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is 
to assist trial preparation.”  Id. at 54.  As to the second prong, the 1st Circuit determined 
that “there is scant value and considerable danger in a rule that could result in requiring 
counsel for a criminal defendant to prematurely expose trial strategy to public scrutiny.”  
Id.  
 CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that “[t]here is no First Amendment right of 
public access to the subpoenas or related materials.”  Id. at 54. 
  
QUESTION TWO:  Whether there is a common law right of public access to Rule 
17(c) subpoenas.  Id. at 52. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Specific reporter pages were not assigned at time of publication; pin cites reflect Lexis page numbers.  
The Lexis cite is: United States v. Cameron, No. 11-1275, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23397 (1st Cir. Nov. 14, 
2012). 
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 ANALYSIS:  The 1st Circuit first explained that, “when considering whether the 
common law right of access applies, the cases turn on whether the documents that are 
sought constitute ‘judicial records.’”  Id. at 54.  The 1st Circuit then reasoned that “Rule 
17(c) materials relate merely to the judge’s trial management role[,]” and are 
distinguishable from “judicial records,” which are “materials on which a court relies in 
determining the litigants’ substantive rights.”  Id. at 55.  The court further noted “that 
even with respect to civil discovery, which does not implicate the same level of concern 
about revealing a criminal defendant’s strategy, there is no right of public access.”  Id.  
 CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that there is no common law right of public 
access to Rule 17(c) subpoenas.  Id. at 56. 
 
United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.  2013) 
QUESTION:  “Whether the district court’s commission of a significant procedural 
error, here its failure to calculate [the defendant’s] guidelines sentencing range, is subject 
to harmless-error analysis . . . .”  Id. at 25–26. 
ANALYSIS:  The 1st Circuit noted that other circuits have found “a failure to 
calculate definitively the guidelines sentencing range” and other “serious procedural 
sentencing lapses” are subject to the harmless-error analysis.  Id. at 26.  The court 
observed that the Supreme Court has recognized “the continued validity of harmless-error 
analysis in procedural error cases.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that “the district court’s failure to choose 
between the two proposed guidelines sentencing ranges and determine definitively which 
applied” was subject to the harmless error analysis.  Id. at 28. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
Bacolitsas v. 86th & 3rd Owner, LLC, 702 F.3d 673 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether §1703(d)(1) of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 
(“ILSA”) requires the description of the lot, the agreement, or both to be written in a form 
that is acceptable for recording under state law.  Id. at 676. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began its analysis by discussing the district court’s 
decision, which interpreted §1703(d)(1) as requiring the entire agreement to be recorded.  
Id. at 679.  The 2nd Circuit disagreed on the basis of grammar and statutory construction.  
Id.  The court stated that the phrase, “which is in a form acceptable for recording[,]” 
modifies the word description, not agreement, based on rules of grammar.  Id.  The 2nd 
Circuit explained the language of the statute only requires the description be written in a 
way acceptable for recording; it does not require an actual recording.  Id. at 680.  The 
court finally explained that requiring the description to be written in a form acceptable for 
recording furthers the underlying purpose of the statute, which is to prevent fraudulent 
transfers.  Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that §1703(d)(1) of the ILSA only requires 
the description of the lot, and not the agreement as a whole, to be written in a form that is 
acceptable for recording.  Id. at 676. 
 
Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2011) 
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 QUESTION:  Whether evidence of several other projects treated differently with 
regard to discrete land use issues is sufficient to support a class-of-one claim under the 
14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 222. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court reasoned that the purpose behind requiring sufficient 
similarity among comparators in a class-of-one claim is to demonstrate that there was no 
legitimate reason for the government’s disparate treatment.  Id.  Where the discrete issues 
in comparator projects are so similar to the case at bar that they are not affected by the 
character of each land use project, such disparity in treatment cannot fairly be attributed 
to government discretion.  Id. at 224.  An appellant cannot identify just one comparator 
that is similar in all respects.  Id. at 223.  Rather, evidence of multiple projects, each 
addressing a discrete issue and not sufficiently disparate in other extenuating 
circumstances, will satisfy the requirement of comparators in a class-of-one claim.  Id. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that, where a plaintiff presents 
overwhelming evidence of being singled out regarding discrete land use issues and the 
government fails to explain how each comparator project’s features influence of said 
discrete issues, “differential treatment with regard to them cannot be explained by 
anything other than discrimination” and this is sufficient to support a class-of-one Equal 
Protection claim.  Id. at 223–24. 
 
Koch v. Christie’s International PLC, 699 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) “requires that a plaintiff have knowledge of a defendant’s 
scienter, as well as alleged injury, for the plaintiff’s claim to accrue.”  Id. at 148. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit began by recognizing that the Supreme Court, in 
Rotella v. Wood, decided that “discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other 
elements of the claim, is what starts the clock.”  Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court noted that a subsequent Supreme Court decision involving the 
Securities Exchange Act, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, required a plaintiff to have 
knowledge of a defendant’s scienter and knowledge of an injury for a claim to accrue.  Id.  
The court reasoned, however, that because “[t]here is a presumption that the Supreme 
Court does not overrule itself sub silentio[,]” and because that subsequent case did not 
mention civil RICO claims, the Rotella decision was controlling.  Id. at 149–50.  The 
court further reasoned that the injury discovery rule serves the policies advanced by the 
Court in Rotella by holding plaintiffs to a higher standard.  Id. at 150.   
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that “a RICO claim accrues upon the 
discovery of the injury alone.”  Id.  
 
Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012) 
        QUESTION:  Whether a child who did not legally immigrate to the United States can 
be found to have settled here within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction.  Id. at 45. 
         ANALYSIS:  The 2nd Circuit stated that if more than a year passed since the child 
was removed from his home country, a showing that the child is now settled may be 
sufficient to refuse repatriation.  Id. at 51–52.  The court stated that several factors, 
including the age of the child, the stability of his environment, the respondent’s 
employment and financial stability, among other factors, must be considered to determine 
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whether the child is “settled.”  Id. at 56–57.  The court noted that a child’s immigration 
status, though a relevant factor, is not dispositive.  Id. at 57.   
         CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that the “now settled” defense is not subject to 
equitable tolling and that a child who lacks legal status in the United States is not 
foreclosed from being deemed to have settled in this country within the meaning of the 
Hague Convention.  Id. at 58–59. 
 
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION ONE:  Whether, when one claims Social Security Income benefits, 
“evidence of a qualifying deficit in adult cognitive functioning serves as prima facie 
evidence that those deficits existed prior to a petitioner’s twenty-second birthday . . . .”  
Id. at 148. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court noted that the majority of other circuits have held that “it is 
reasonable to presume, in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise, that claimants 
will experience a fairly constant IQ throughout their lives, and “the requirement that a 
claimant’s intellectual disability arose before age 22 seems intended to limit coverage to 
an innate condition rather than a condition resulting from a disease or accident in 
adulthood.”  Id. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that a 
claimant’s evidence of qualifying limitations as an adult is sufficient to establish a 
rebuttable presumption that those limitations arose before age 22.  Id. at 148.  
 
QUESTION TWO:  Whether “a petitioner must separately establish deficits in her 
cognitive and adaptive functioning” to be considered mentally retarded.  Id. at 148.   
ANALYSIS: The court interpreted the Social Security Administration’s regulations 
addressing the burden of establishing that the claimant suffers from qualifying deficits in 
adaptive functioning “to mean that an applicant’s inadequate adaptive functioning must 
arise from her cognitive limitations, rather than from a physical ailment or other 
infirmity.”  Id. at 153.   
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that a claimant must show deficits in both 
adaptive functioning and cognitive functioning to be qualified as mentally retarded.  Id. at 
148.  
 
United States v. Abdur-Rahman, No. 10-4814-cr, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3310 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 15, 2013) 
QUESTION:  Whether health care fraud constitutes an enumerated felony violation 
recognized in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, the federal aggravated identity theft statute.  Id. at *2.  
 ANALYSIS:  The court noted that subsection (c)(5) of § 1028A provides that “the 
term ‘felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)’ means any offense that is a violation 
of . . . any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud).”  Id. 
at *3.  The court reasoned that, given the varying ways in which Congress uses the phrase 
“relating to” in Subsection 1028A(c), “the plain language of section 1028A [read as a 
whole] indicates that Congress’s use of parentheticals and the phrase ‘relating to’ in 
Subsection 1028A(c) serves only an explanatory or descriptive purpose and does not 
expressly limit the definition of felony violation to only those offenses identified in the 
parenthetical.”  Id. at *5.  The court further reasoned that “any other reading would 
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ignore the plain language and structure of the statute, fail to comport with the Supreme 
Court’s guidance on the meaning of ‘relating to,’ and render Congress’s use of the phrase 
‘any provision contained in Chapter 63’ inoperative.”  Id. at *11. 
 CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that the parenthetical language ‘relating to 
mail, bank, and wire fraud’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(5) is merely a shorthand signal to the 
reader concerning the general nature of offenses contained in Chapter 63” and is not 
meant to limit felonies recognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A) to only to those three 
identified in the Chapter 63 parenthetical.  Id. at *10.  The 2nd Circuit therefore held that 
health care fraud is a recognizable predicate felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5).  Id. at 
*11.  
 
United States v. Catoggio, 698 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION:  “Whether a district court may exercise its authority under the All 
Writs Act, [28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),] to restrain a convicted defendant’s funds in anticipation 
of sentencing . . . .”  Id. at 66.  
 ANALYSIS:  As a preliminary matter, the court noted that because the “All Writs 
Act is aimed at achieving the rational ends of law[,] . . . courts have significant flexibility 
in exercising their authority under the Act.”  Id. at 67 (internal citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court then noted that lower courts had determined “that a 
sentencing court may use the All Writs Act to prevent the defendant from frustrating 
collection of the restitution debt.”  Id.  The court reasoned that, absent authority to ensure 
compliance with the district court's anticipated order of restitution, a court could not stop 
a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing from disposing of assets in an effort to avoid 
paying restitution or other fines and court costs.  Id. at 68–69.   
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that “the district court properly exercised its 
authority under the All Writs Act to restrain assets in anticipation of resentencing.”  Id. at 
68.  
 
U.S. v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision impacts 
court-ordered conditions of a criminal sentence.  Id at 169. 
ANALYSIS:  First, the court determined that the standard of review is de novo 
“[b]ecause applicability of the §362(b)(1) exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic 
stay presents a question of law.”  Id. at 173.  The court then found that the plain language 
of the statute “exempts the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or 
proceeding against the debtor from the automatic stay afforded by §362(a).”  Id.  The 
court further reasoned that the common understanding of the terms “criminal proceeding” 
suggests that Congress intended to “create an exception for any action or proceeding that 
relates to an adjudication of guilt or that punishes a defendant for crimes.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that proceedings to enforce a probationary 
sentence “fall within an express exception to the automatic stay because they constitute a 
continuation of the criminal action or proceeding.”  Id. at 169. 
 
United States v. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether a court can rely on a probation department’s presentence 
investigation report (PSR) description of a “defendant’s pre-arrest conduct that 
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culminated in a prior conviction to determine whether that prior conviction constitutes 
one for a ‘crime of violence’ under [United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)] § 
4B1.2(a)(1), where the defendant makes no objection to the PSR’s description.”  Id. at 
455.  
ANALYSIS:  The 2nd Circuit first established that, because Reyes did not object 
“to his classification as a career offender,” the court reviewed his classification only for 
plain error.  Id. at 457.  The court, focusing on the language of the statute, determined 
that whether a conviction is a “crime of violence” depends on the “defendant’s 
conviction, not the defendant’s conduct in a particular case.”  Id. at 459.  Thus, the court 
reasoned that underlying facts cannot be taken into consideration to make this 
determination.  Id.  The court recognized that generally, “reliance on a federal PSR’s 
factual description of a defendant’s pre-arrest conduct to determine whether a prior 
offense constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ . . . is prohibited.”  Id.   
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that reliance on an uncontested description in 
a PSR of pre-arrest conduct to “determine whether that prior conviction constitutes one 
for a ‘crime of violence’” is improper.  Id. at 455. 
 
United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether 18 U.S.C § 1591(c), “which provides that ‘in a prosecution . 
. . in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the [victim], the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the 
age of 18 years,’” requires the government to prove “the defendant’s awareness of the 
victim’s age . . . .”  Id. at 26 (alteration in original). 
ANALYSIS:  The court began by examining the plain language of §1591(c), and 
observed that the text does not impose “an additional element on top of the mens rea 
requirement” that requires the government to prove “knowledge” or “reckless disregard.”  
Id. at 31.  Rather, the court reasoned that §1591(c) provides “an alternative to proving 
any mens rea [under §1591(a)] with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s 
age.”  Id. at 32.  Specifically, the court outlined three separate avenues for proving a 
defendant’s awareness of a victim’s status as a minor: (1) the defendant’s knowledge that 
the minor was under eighteen; (2) the defendant’s reckless disregard of the minor’s age; 
or (3) the defendant’s reasonable opportunity to observe the age of the victim/minor.  Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 2nd Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), “when applicable, 
imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age, thus 
relieving the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the 
victim’s underage status under § 1591(a).”  Id. at 26. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
D.K. v. Abington School District, 696 F. 3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the scope of the “specific misrepresentations” 
exception to the IDEA’s statute of limitations includes misrepresentations made by the 
School District regarding the ability of individualized supports to sufficiently address the 
student’s deficits.  Id. at 245.   
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that “both statutory and regulatory guidance are 
lacking regarding the contours of the ‘specific misrepresentations’” exception.  Id. 
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(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court identified one state appeals court and 
several district courts to have considered the issue, and agreed that “a showing of 
‘misrepresentation’ akin to intent, deceit, or egregious misstatement” is required.  Id.  
The court reasoned that, if it were to hold otherwise, “any plaintiff whose teachers first 
recommended behavioral programs or instructional steps short of formal special 
education might invoke the exception[,]” which cannot be the intent of the regulation.  Id. 
at 245–46. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that, “in order to be excused from the statute 
of limitations based on [the ‘specific misrepresentations’ exception] . . . because the 
school specifically misrepresented that it had resolved the problem, plaintiffs must show 
that the school intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived them regarding their 
child's progress.”  Id. at 246.   
 
QUESTION TWO:  Whether the scope of the “withholding of information” 
exception to the IDEA’s statute of limitations applies to a “permission to evaluate form,” 
which the school district is not statutorily mandated to provide.  Id. at 245, 247. 
ANALYSIS:  The court specified that the text of the statute “plainly indicates that 
only the failure to supply statutorily mandated disclosures can toll the statute of 
limitations.”  Id. at 246.  The court then found that because the School District was not 
obligated to disclose the “permission to evaluate form” in the particular circumstances at 
bar, the exception was not applicable.  Id. at 247. 
CONCLUSION:     The court held that where the School District is not statutorily 
mandated to disclose information, the “withholding of information” exception to the 
IDEA’s statute of limitation does not apply.   	  
In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2012)	  
QUESTION:  “[W]hat does the Bankruptcy Code require a Chapter 13 trustee to do 
with undistributed funds received pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 13 plan when that 
Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7?”  Id. at 308.	  
ANALYSIS:  The 3rd Circuit first noted that “when a debtor converts a Chapter 13 
case to Chapter 7, the order converting the case is effectively backdated to the time of the 
order for relief under Chapter 13, which is the date of the filing of the Chapter 13 
petition.”  Id. at 310.  The court further noted, “[b]ecause under § 348(a), the date of the 
filing of the [Chapter 7] petition is the date the debtor filed the Chapter 13 petition, this 
suggests that property of the Chapter 13 estate acquired post-petition is excluded from the 
property of the new Chapter 7 estate.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
determined that when a debtor pays a Chapter 13 trustee after the filing of the Chapter 13 
petition, that debtor still has a vested interest in those assets until they are distributed to 
creditors.  Id. at 313.  The court observed that “[b]ecause § 1327(b) vests all property of 
the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor, including any post-petition property held by the 
Chapter 13 trustee at the time of conversion (such as funds transferred to the estate for 
eventual distribution to creditors), on conversion property of the Chapter 13 estate 
usually is under the control of the debtor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court explained that “property acquired post-petition that is in the Chapter 13 estate at the 
time of conversion is not property of the new Chapter 7 estate.”  Id.  Rather, the court 
noted, “the debtor retains a vested interest in the property, and thereby the property 
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reverts to the debtor on conversion, assuming that the debtor does not convert in bad 
faith.”  Id.   
CONCLUSION:  The 3rd Circuit held that all funds received by Chapter 13 trustees 
after the initial petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and prior to distribution revert to the 
debtor if the estate is converted to a Chapter 7 estate.  Id. at 316. 
 
National Sec. Sys. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2011) 
QUESTION: Whether “an insurance agent who makes fraudulent or misleading 
statements to induce participation in an ERISA plan is amenable to suit under state law 
theories of recovery.”  Id. at 84. 
ANALYSIS:  The 3rd Circuit analyzed the case of an insurance agent who 
misrepresented the presence of a reserve fund, accessibility of conversion credits and the 
nature of his commissions, all of which induced plaintiffs to participate in an ERISA 
plan.  Id. at 84.  The court noted that these claims are common law claims of 
misrepresentation, and if they have a connection with the administration of the plan, such 
a connection would result in their pre-emption under the pre-emption doctrine.  Id.  The 
court found, however, that a “state’s common law, generally intended to prevent sellers 
of goods and services, including benefit plans, from misrepresenting the scope of their 
services, is quite remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned—
reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like.”  Id. at 85.   
CONCLUSION:  The 3rd Circuit held that ERISA does not preempt state law 
claims for misrepresentation that “are not premised on a challenge to the actual 
administration of the plan.”  Id. 
 
PG Publishing Company v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether the Richmond Newspapers (or “experience and logic”) test 
for “evaluating whether a right of access to information about government bodies, their 
processes and their decision” applies to a polling place or to the process of voting.  Id. at 
104. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court began by noting that the Richmond Newspapers test 
“balances the interests of the People in observing and monitoring the functions of their 
government against the government’s interest and/or long-standing historical practice of 
keeping certain information from public scrutiny.”  Id.  The court then looked to prior 
decisions for guidance on the appropriate scope and application of the test.  Id. at 104–06.  
Observing that in prior cases the court had applied the Richmond Newspapers broadly, 
the court found that “an extension of the ‘experience and logic’ test to the polling place is 
in line with the general trend of [its] decisional authority[,]” and respects the interests of 
the government and the public.  Id. at 106, 107.  
 CONCLUSION:  The 3rd Circuit held that “the experience and balance test 
articulated in Richmond Newspapers is applicable to the voting process.”  Id. at 106.   
 
United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether the United States Sentencing Commission’s (the 
“Commission”) revision of the § 1B1.10 policy statement—prohibiting the reduction of 
imprisonment sentences imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)—exceeded its authority, 
violated separation of powers principles, and failed to comply with the Administrative 
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Procedure Act’s (“APA”) notice-and-comment provisions; thus, precluding its binding 
effect.  Id. at 518–19. 
ANALYSIS:  The 3rd Circuit determined that the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) 
authorized the Commission to impose limitations on sentence reductions pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 994(a) and (u), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Id. at 520–23.  The court 
explained that “§ 994(u) requires the Commission to specify by what amount sentences 
may be reduced based on retroactive amendments, § 994(a)(2)(C) requires that this 
specification be in the form of a policy statement, and § 3582(c)(2) makes those policy 
statements binding.”  Id. at 523 (citing another source).  As to the separation of powers 
principle, the court found that “a delegation of legislative power is permissible if 
Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform.’”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court found that the intelligible principle was easily met 
by the clarity of §§ 994(a) and (u), and § 3582(c)(2).  Id. at 523–25.  The court observed 
that even though § 1B1.10 constrains a court’s ability to reduce sentences imposed under 
§ 3582(c)(2), the Commission’s establishment of such a limit fell squarely within its 
function.  Id. at 526.  As to the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions, the court 
observed that 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) is silent as to the Commission’s issuance of policy 
statements.  Id.  The court therefore found the Commission is exempt from the APA’s 
notice-and-comment provisions when issuing policy statements.  Id. at 527. 
CONCLUSION:  The 3rd Circuit held that the Commission properly issued its 
revised policy statement for § 1B1.10, and therefore it is valid.  Id. 
 
United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION:  Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) criminalizes obtaining an authentic 
passport or visa by fraudulent means.  Id. at 128–29. 
 ANALYSIS:   The 3rd Circuit began by noting that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
provides that “[w]hoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters or falsely makes any . . . 
document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United States . . . [commits 
an offense under this section.]”  Id. at 129 (last alteration in original).  The court 
distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Campos–Serrano because 
the issue there involved whether a particular forged document was prohibited by the 
statute, not whether the statute criminalized possession of an authentic document 
obtained by fraud.  Id. at 130.  Consistent with the 9th Circuit’s interpretation, the court 
reasoned that Campos–Serrano was not an attempt to describe the entire reach of the first 
paragraph of § 1546(a).  Id. at 131.  In determining that obtaining a passport by fraud was 
covered by the statute’s “falsely make clause,” the court rejected the defendant’s narrow 
reading of the statute by considering basic rules of statutory construction, including the 
avoidance of surplusage and bizarre results.  Id. at 134–35.  The 3rd Circuit also 
considered Supreme Court precedent, which found that the phrase “falsely make” is 
broad enough to include documents procured by fraud.  Id. at 135.  Finally, the court 
reasoned that the statute is not sufficiently ambiguous to justify resorting to the rule of 
lenity.  Id. at 138. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 3rd Circuit concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) “must be read 
to prohibit the possession or use of authentic immigration documents which are obtained 
by fraud.”  Id. at 139.  
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FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION:  Whether a “minimal” or a “very strong showing” of inadequacy 
should be required where proposed intervenors, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24, share the same objective as a government party.  Id. at 351. 
ANALYSIS:  The 4th Circuit first noted that every circuit to rule on the issue has 
held that a strong showing of inadequacy is required.  Id.  The court started its analysis by 
explaining that the government’s “basic duty” in public law litigation is to represent the 
public interest.  Id.  The court reasoned that “the government is simply the most natural 
party” to defend a statute when it faces a constitutional challenge.  Id.  The 4th Circuit 
further noted that the government is familiar “with the matters of public concern that lead 
to the statute’s passage in the first place.”  Id.  The court opined that allowing private 
parties and entities to intervene with only a minimal showing of inadequacy would 
“greatly complicate the government’s job” with altered litigation strategies to 
accommodate the intervenors or more costly, complicated litigation.  Id.  The court also 
reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would place a severe and unnecessary burden on 
government agencies as they seek to fulfill their basic duty of representing the people in 
matters of public litigation.”  Id. at 352. 
CONCLUSION:  The 4th Circuit held that a proposed intervenor must make a 
strong showing of inadequacy when existing defendants are represented by a government 
agency.  Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT  
 
Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro SAB De CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 
2012)  
QUESTION: Whether a court may determine if 11 U.S.C. § 1521 or § 1507 are 
applicable when a foreign representative requests relief under either provision.  Id. at 
1054. 
ANALYSIS:  The 5th Circuit held that courts should first consider whether relief 
under one of the listed and explicit provisions under § 1521 is applicable.  Id. at 1056.  
The court explained that if the requested relief does not fall under one of the explicit 
provisions, a court should decide if the relief more appropriately falls under § 1521(a)’s 
general “appropriate relief.”  Id. at 1056.  The 5th Circuit stated that a court must then 
consider whether the relief sought had been previously granted under § 304.  Id.  The 
court noted that only if the relief goes beyond what § 304 previously provided or 
currently afforded by United States law, may a court consider § 1507.  Id. at 1057.           
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that a court may determine the applicability 
of §§1521 and 1507.  Id. at 1054.   
 
Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder, 702 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether burglary of a vehicle, as defined by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30–
16–3(B), constitutes a crime of violence so as to render a defendant removable pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Id. at 782–83. 
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ANALYSIS:  The 5th Circuit noted that “Section 1101(a)(43)(F) defines an 
aggravated felony as a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at 
least one year.”  Id. at 784 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court then noted that “[a] crime of violence is any offense that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used 
in the course of committing the offense.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
comparing a similar statute from Texas, the court posited that there is a significant risk 
that physical force will be used on another’s property when a vehicle is burglarized.  Id.  
CONCLUSION:   The 5th Circuit concluded that “burglary of a vehicle under the 
New Mexico statute constitutes a crime of violence . . . [,]” and thus, a defendant is 
removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Id.  
 
First Investment Corp. v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION:  “[W]hether a court may dismiss a petition to confirm a foreign 
arbitration award for lack of personal jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards[]” and the New York 
Convention.  Id. at 744. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began its analysis with a discussion of the standard for 
review and enforcement actions under the New York Convention, particularly the 
difference between primary jurisdiction and secondary jurisdiction.  Id. at 748–49.  The 
court noted that when an enforcement action is brought in a country that is neither the 
venue nor the choice of law for the arbitration, that country has secondary jurisdiction.  
Id.  The court explained that a country with secondary jurisdiction may not refuse to 
enforce an arbitration award unless one of the New York Convention’s seven enumerated 
exceptions applies.  Id.  The court explained that, although personal jurisdiction is not 
one of the enumerated exceptions, it is “an essential element of the jurisdiction of a 
district . . . court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication,” 
and that the Due Process Clause requires a court to dismiss an action in the absence of 
personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 749. 
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that “dismissal of a petition under the New 
York Convention for lack of personal jurisdiction is appropriate as a matter of 
constitutional due process.”  Id. at 748. 
 
LifeCare Management Services, LLC v. Insurance Management Administrators, Inc., 
703 F.3d 835 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION:  Whether an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
claimant “may bring a lawsuit under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan” against a Third Party Administrator (“TPA”).  Id. at 843 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS:  The 5th Circuit first determined that the plain language of 
§1132(a)(1)(B) “does not limit the scope of defendants that a claimant may bring a 
lawsuit against.”  Id. at 843.  The court noted that the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits have 
found that “entities other than the benefits plan or the employer plan administrators may 
be held liable under §1132(a)(1)(B).”  Id.  The court further noted that courts find 
liability under §1132(a)(1)(B) only if the party “exercises ‘actual control’ over the 
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administration of the plan.”  Id.  The 5th Circuit reasoned that “the proper party 
defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party that controls 
administration of the plan.”  Id. at 844 (internal quotations omitted). 
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that a TPA may be held liable under 
§1132(a)(1)(B) “only if it exercises ‘actual control’ over the plan’s benefits claims 
process.”  Id. 
 
Sosebee v. Steadfast Insurance Co., 701 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir.)  
QUESTION:  “Whether an insurer may waive its coverage defenses through its 
conduct in a direct action suit in which the insured is not a party while the insured is in 
bankruptcy . . . .”  Id. at 1021 (emphasis omitted). 
ANALYSIS:  Citing to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 541(a) (2006), the 5th Circuit explained 
that an estate is created after a debtor declares bankruptcy.  Id. at 1023.  The court noted 
that profits of a liability insurance policy are not considered property of the estate, unlike 
insurance policies, which are typically part of the estate.  Id.  The court then explained 
that only when there is a threat that “claims against the debtor’s insurer might exhaust 
insurance proceeds and thus threaten the debtor’s estate over and above limits of liability 
insurance policies have courts held the proceeds of liability insurance policies are 
property of the bankruptcy estate.”  Id.  The court found, therefore, if a party brings a 
direct action against the insurer, the claimant will recover directly from the insurer, not 
the bankruptcy estate.  Id. at 1024.  The court reasoned that a personal injury claimant 
also has the option of filing a claim against the debtor in the bankruptcy action, and the 
court must then lift the bankruptcy stay if the debtor objects to the case.  Id.          
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that “[w]here a court finds insurance 
proceeds to be property of the bankruptcy estate the automatic stay will apply to direct 
actions against insurers . . ., but where the proceeds of the insurance policies are not 
property of the bankruptcy estate, direct actions insurers will not be affected by the stay.”  
Id. at 1025.   
 
Strickland v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether a new federal habeas petition is a ‘second or successive’ 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, where, “in an initial petition the [district] court decided 
an exhausted claim on the merits and dismissed the unexhausted claims without 
prejudice, stating the petitioner may return to federal court after exhausting the 
unexhausted claims, and the petitioner seeks to refile his petition after exhausting the 
unexhausted claims.”  Id. at 174.   
ANALYSIS:  The 5th Circuit explained that “because exhaustion is based on 
comity rather than jurisdiction, there is no absolute bar to federal consideration of 
unexhausted habeas applications.”  Id. (citing another source).  The court noted that 
“[t]here is no precedent in [its] cases for holding a claim previously dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to meet the exhaustion requirement is a ‘second or successive’ 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) if refiled after exhaustion.”  Id. at 176.  The court 
emphasized that the petitioner “relied on the [district] court’s statement that he could 
‘again seek federal habeas corpus relief’ once he exhausted his unexhausted claims.”  Id.  
The court stated that “district courts cannot send petitioners on wild goose chases by 
permitting them to split their exhausted and unexhausted claims, guaranteeing them 
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federal habeas review if they exhaust their state court remedies, only to then deny them 
habeas review once they have exhausted their state remedies.”  Id. 	  
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that petitioner’s new habeas petition is not a 
“second or successive” petition for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 given his reliance 
on the district court’s statements concerning federal habeas relief.  Id. at 176–77.   
 
United States v. 0.073 Acres of Land, 705 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2013)  
 QUESTION:  “[W]hether the federal government must provide just compensation 
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it condemns property burdened 
by a plaintiff’s right to collect and thereby diminishes the plaintiff’s assessment base.”  
Id. at 543–44.  
 ANALYSIS:  First, the 5th Circuit noted that “the government is required to provide 
just compensation if the interest for which compensation is sought is a property interest 
or right, and that interest has actually been taken.”  Id. at 545.  Then, the court found that 
the right to collect assessments can be understood as a real covenant, and is a property 
interest.  Id. at 546.  The court reasoned that the right to collect assessments is unlike 
“recognized forms of compensable intangible property, such as easements, in that it is not 
directly connected with the are made,” but are contractual in their nature.  Id. at 548.  The 
court further reasoned that allowing for compensation for “condemnations that eliminate 
interests that do not stem from the physical substance of the land . . . would unjustifiably 
burden the government’s eminent domain power.”  Id. at 549.  
 CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that the “right to collect assessments is not a 
compensable interest under the Takings Clause.”  Id.  
 
United States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, No. 11-41063, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22043 
(5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2012) 
 QUESTION:  Whether the elements required for a conviction of conspiracy under 
21 U.S.C. § 846 “are consistent with the meaning of ‘conspiring’ in Application Note 5 
of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)” such that a 16-level enhancement was appropriate under 
the Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at *4.   
 ANALYSIS:   The 5th Circuit first reasoned that the generic meaning of 
“conspiracy” should be used since the Guidelines do not define it.  Id. at *4.  The court 
then noted that the meaning of a word may be gleaned using “the Model Penal Code, 
treatises, federal and state law, dictionaries, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” 
Id. at *4–5.  This meaning, according to the court, “generally corresponds to the 
definition in a majority of the States’ criminal codes.”  Id. at *5.  The 5th Circuit 
determined from such sources that “conspiracy” generally requires an overt action or 
conduct in furtherance of an agreement.  Id. at *5–6.  The court finally noted that it is 
well established that § 846 does not require an overt act.  Id. at *6–7. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit concluded that the enhancement was inappropriate 
because § 846 does not require an overt act, and therefore a conviction under that section 
could not trigger the enhancement for conspiring in Application Note 5 of 
§2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at *6. 
 
United States v. Silva-De Hoyos, 702 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2012) 
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 QUESTION:  Whether convictions for possession with intent to distribute and 
importation of cocaine are offenses amounting to “the distribution of controlled 
substances” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 862.  Id. at 848. 
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that the 11th and 10th Circuits interpreted the 
language of § 862(a) to require actual distribution, not the intent to distribute.  Id. at 849.  
The 5th Circuit agreed that “possession with intent to distribute is not an offense 
consisting of distribution of controlled substances” within the meaning of the statute.  Id. 
at 849.  Since neither defendant’s conviction included actual distribution, defendant’s 
convictions were not offenses under § 862(a).  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The 5th Circuit held that the “district court’s conclusion that [the 
defendant] was convicted of two drug-trafficking offenses was error that was plain.”  Id. 
at 849. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
McCormick v. Miami University, 693 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive mechanism to 
bring suit against state officials “acting in their individual capacity for alleged violations 
of § 1981.”  Id. at 656. 
 ANALYSIS:  The 6th Circuit began by noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District holds that § 1983 provides the exclusive 
mechanism for obtaining monetary damages for § 1981 violations by state actors who 
acted in their official capacity.  Id. at 658.  The court acknowledged that Congress 
amended § 1981 after Jett and that amendment created disagreement about the continued 
viability of Jett’s holding.  Id. at 660.  The court looked to its own precedent, which holds 
that the amendment to § 1981 did not overrule Jett, but also did not yet address suits 
against officials in their individual capacity.  Id. at 660–61.  The court then reasoned that 
a plurality in Jett found that Congress created § 1983’s precursor to provide the first and 
only federal damages remedy against state actors, and that because § 1983 provided a 
remedy to vindicate § 1981 violations, no federal damages remedy under § 1981 existed 
against a state actor in his or her official capacity.  Id. at 661.  The court opined that the 
Jett plurality’s reasoning “naturally extend[s] to the context of individual state actors 
sued in their individual capacity.”  Id.  
 CONCLUSION:  The court concluded “that § 1983 is the exclusive mechanism to 
vindicate violations of § 1981 by an individual state actor acting in his individual 
capacity.”  Id 
 
Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION:  “[W]hether Congress has waived sovereign immunity for breach-of-
settlement-agreement claims brought under Title VII against the federal government as 
employer.”  Id. at 331. 
ANALYSIS:  The 6th Circuit posited that the federal government’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity “must be clear, express, and unambiguous; it cannot be implied from 
vague language.”  Id. at 333.  The court noted that the 4th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have 
found that, based on the plain language of 29 C.F.R. §1614.504 and 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
16(c), Congress did not waive sovereign immunity.  Id. at 334.  The 6th Circuit reasoned 
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that 29 C.F.R. §1614.504 “provides clear instructions as to the exclusive procedures by 
which a complainant may seek relief—specific performance of the settlement agreement 
or reinstatement of the original complaint.”  Id. at 335. 
CONCLUSION:  The 6th Circuit held that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity 
for breach-of-settlement-agreement claims brought under Title VII against the federal 
government as employer.  Id. 
 
United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which prohibits consideration of a 
defendant’s rehabilitative needs when sentencing him to prison following conviction, 
applies to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which requires a court to consider that defendant’s 
rehabilitative needs when it revokes his supervised release term.  Id. at 764. 
 ANALYSIS:   The court noted that the Supreme Court in Tapia v. U.S. “held that § 
3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to 
promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”  Id. at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court then pointed out that there is no qualitative difference between a defendant’s 
confinement when he is sent to prison due to a revoked supervised release and his initial 
imprisonment after conviction.  Id. at 766.  The court went on to explain that its 
“interpretation of § 3583(e)(3) works no harm on § 3583(e)’s more general requirement 
that a court consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors, including rehabilitation.”  Id. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 6th Circuit concluded that a court may not take account of a 
defendant’s rehabilitative goals to impose or increase a prison sentence following the 
repudiation of his supervised release.  Id. at 765.  
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Uribe, No. 11-3590, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2941 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 
2013) 
QUESTION:  Whether a “discrepancy between the observed color of a car and the 
color listed on its registration alone” sufficiently creates a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity in conjunction with a Terry stop.  Id. at *9–10. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court noted a significant dearth of evidence the government 
provided in its effort to “tip the scales from a mere hunch to something even approaching 
reasonable and articulable suspicion” in order “to justify a detention based on one 
observed incident of completely innocent behavior in a non-suspicious context.”  Id. at 
*13.  The court also observed that “the government provided no information on the 
correlation between stolen vehicles and repainted ones.”  Id.  The court reasoned that, in 
weighing the defendant’s “Fourth Amendment rights against the benefits of using 
investigatory stops to catch car thieves and recover stolen vehicles, [that correlation 
matters].”  Id.  The court explained that without evidence of correlation or other 
supporting evidence, it could not “conclude that a color discrepancy alone is probative of 
wrongdoing without the risk of subjecting a substantial number of innocent drivers and 
passengers to detention.”  Id. at *13–14 
 CONCLUSION:  The 7th Circuit held “that no reasonable suspicion of vehicle theft 
attaches to a completely lawful color discrepancy in the absence of any evidence 
suggesting otherwise.”  Id. at *14. 
_____________	   	  BB	  and	  Atrib.	  Initials	   Combined	  FIs	  18	  
 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT  
 
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether a “district court judge [is required] to issue explicit findings 
of bad faith and prejudice before giving an adverse inference instruction at trial, or if such 
findings may be implicit” when there is an alleged spoliation of evidence by one party.  
Id. at 461. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court found that its precedent holds that “an explicit bad faith 
finding is required in the usual case involving pre-litigation spoliation of evidence.”  Id.  
The court then took into consideration “the gravity of an adverse inference instruction, 
which “brands one party as a bad actor,” as compared to the court’s burden of making on-
the-record declarations.  Id.  In doing so, the 8th Circuit found that the court’s minimal 
burden “is offset by [its] interests in ensuring that sanctions are imposed only after 
thoughtful consideration and an appropriate weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 461–62. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 8th Circuit held “that a district court must issue explicit 
findings of bad faith and prejudice prior to delivering an adverse inference instruction.”  
Id. at 461. 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
Cheema v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2012)  
QUESTION:  Whether the “written advisals provided on the standard I-589 asylum 
application form constitute sufficient notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4)(A).”  Id. at 
1046.  
ANALYSIS:  The court began by noting that asylum applicants must receive 
adequate notice of the right to an attorney and the frivolous application penalties, which 
include becoming permanently ineligible for any immigration benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(d)(6).  Id.  The court agreed with the 10th Circuit in finding that the statute does not 
specify a particular format in which the applicant must receive this notice.  Id. at 1049.  
The court reasoned that because the language of the warning on the application for 
asylum “supplies all of the information concerning the consequences of filing a frivolous 
application to which the alien is entitled under the unambiguous language of § 
1158(d)(4)(A),” the “warning on the asylum application adequately notifies the applicant 
of both the consequences of knowingly filing a frivolous application for asylum as well 
as the privilege of being represented by counsel, as required by [the statute].”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that “the written advisals on the I-589 asylum 
application form provide applicants with adequate notice of the consequences of filing a 
frivolous asylum application and of the privilege of being represented by counsel as 
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4)(A).”  Id. at 1050. 
 
Corpuz v. Holder, 697 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION:  Whether all or part of a criminal defendant’s time spent in pre-trial 
civil psychiatric confinement should be included in his or her “term of imprisonment” 
under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Id. at 812. 
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 ANALYSIS:  First, while observing that § 212(c) of the INA offers no “plain 
meaning” for the word “imprisonment,” the court noted that within the 9th Circuit, 
“imprisonment” is usually defined as “incarceration in a prison, jail, or other penal 
institution.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit noted that its precedent did not require a criminal 
defendant held in pre-trial civil confinement be given credit against his sentence for time 
spent in the psychiatric facility.  Id. at 813.   The court concluded that because civil 
confinement in a psychiatric facility is not “imprisonment” within the 9th Circuit’s 
definition, one could reasonably argue that none of the defendant’s time spent at the 
psychiatric facility should be counted as part of “his term of imprisonment.”  Id.  The 
court noted, however, that § 212(c)’s “five year imprisonment period” served as the 
dividing line between lesser and more serious offenses, and a defendant serving a 
sentence of more than five years is statutorily precluded from receiving good time credit 
towards obtaining an earlier release.  Id. at 813–14.  The court reasoned that to ignore 
time spent in pre-trial psychiatric confinement while calculating a defendant’s “term of 
imprisonment” would “not accurately reflect the seriousness” of the individual 
defendant’s crime.  Id. at 814.   
 CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit concluded that courts should calculate a 
“constructive good time credit for the period spent in civil confinement based on the 
degree to which the defendant accumulated good time credit while in prison”—only after 
this constructive good time credit is accounted for should time spent in pre-trial 
psychiatric confinement be calculated as part of the defendant’s “term of imprisonment.”  
Id.   
 
Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 704 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION:  Whether a party waived a permissive arbitration right, despite 
intervening Supreme Court precedent, “where the applicability of the right was not clear-
cut, arbitration was never demanded, and the claim was first asserted on appeal following 
trial.”  Id. at 719. 
ANALYSIS:  The 9th Circuit observed that the appellant, a bank, never demanded 
arbitration or raised it as a defense until after an intervening Supreme Court decision.  Id. 
at 720.  The 9th Circuit noted that the bank never sought a stay pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision.  Id.  The court then stated that waiver occurs when there is “(1) 
knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with that 
existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such 
inconsistent acts.”  Id. at 720–21 (citing another source).  The 9th Circuit noted that 
permitting arbitration post-appeal would severely prejudice the appellee, a consumer, as 
the demand must come within a “reasonable time.”  Id.  The court further held that 
permitting post-appeal arbitration would cause more delay and additional costs for both 
parties, while not serving any contractual purpose.  Id. at 721–22. 
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that a party waives a permissive arbitration 
right, despite intervening Supreme Court precedent, “where the applicability of the right 
was not clear-cut, arbitration was never demanded, and the claim was first asserted on 
appeal following trial.”  Id. at 719, 722. 
 
Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2012) 
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QUESTION:  “[W]hether losing a motion to compel . . . based on unpersuasive 
legal arguments, absent other aggravating factors, is enough to warrant Rule 45(c)(1) 
sanctions.”  Id. at 425. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began by noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
45(c)(1) allows sanctions to be imposed upon a party or attorney who “unfairly harms a 
subpoena recipient by acting carelessly or in bad faith.”  Id.  The court recognized that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) requires parties seeking discovery to act without 
bad faith and “reasonably without imposing undue burden or expense.”  Id.  The court 
then looked to formulate a test for when Rule 45(c)(1) permits sanctions.  Id. at 427.   
The court reasoned that absent bad faith, nothing is sanctionable in advocacy found to 
have “fulfilled its Rule 45(c)(1) duties to narrowly tailor the subpoena and issue it in 
compliance with existing law.”  Id. at 429.    
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that sanctions under Rule 45(c)(1) would 
only be appropriate where the subpoena caused an “undue burden.”  Id.  
 
United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION: Whether the admission of certifications of business records by means 
of affidavit, without an authenticating witness, is a plain error in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 971. 
 ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began by recognizing that the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront those who testify against him or her 
at trial.  Id. at 973.  The court then noted that affidavits containing certifications of 
business records are created to authenticate an admissible record, not to create 
testimonial evidence.  Id. at 976.  The court reasoned that because the records do not 
otherwise interpret the substance of the business records to create a record for the sole 
purpose of establishing or proving a fact against a defendant at trial, admissibility was 
permissible absent confrontation.  Id.   
 CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that routine certifications of business records 
by the custodian of such records are admissible under the Confrontation Clause as non-
testimonial mechanisms to authenticate records rather than as substantive evidence 
against criminal defendants.  Id. at 976. 
 
United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION:  Whether a defendant who passively allows others to download child 
pornography is guilty of distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  Id. at 1109. 
 ANALYSIS:  The 9th Circuit first began by noting that all other circuits had 
rejected the argument “that evidence of a deliberate, affirmative action of delivery is 
required to support a conviction for distribution.”  Id. at 1108–09.  The court reasoned 
that passively distributing child pornography is nonetheless a form of distribution 
because it is “consistent with the plain meaning of the word.”  Id. at 1109.   
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that passively distributing child pornography 
is sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  Id. 
 
United States v. De Jesus-Casteneda, 705 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) 
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QUESTION:  “[W]hether a witness’s testimony in disguise at trial violates the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 
1118. 
ANALYSIS:  The 9th Circuit first explained that the Confrontation Clause “grants a 
criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 1119.  The 9th Circuit explained, however, that 
confrontation is not absolute, and “various state courts have derived from Supreme Court 
precedent which addresses the constitutionality of analogous arrangements which 
preclude the normal face-to-face confrontation that occurs when a witness testifies in the 
unobstructed view of the defendant.”  Id.  This test considers “whether the disguise 
furthers an important state interest and whether the reliability of the evidence could be 
otherwise assured.”  Id. at 1120.   
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that allowing a confidential informant to 
wear a disguise while testifying at trial does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long 
as the disguise furthers an important state interest and the reliability of the evidence is 
otherwise assured.  Id.  
 
United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Dixon v. United States that 
the defendant bears the burden of establishing the defense of duress by a preponderance 
of the evidence, “applies to affirmative defenses other than duress.”  Id. at 1145. 
 ANALYSIS:  First, the 9th Circuit noted that the 7th and 6th circuits have already 
addressed similar issues of applying Dixon to other affirmative defenses.  Id.  The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the conclusions of the 6th and 7th circuits in adopting the reasoning 
of the 7th Circuit, explaining that common law affirmative defenses of excuse do not 
negate “knowingly” elements of a crime.  Id. at 1145–46.  The court found that because 
such a defense does not directly controvert an element of the crime, it does not, in itself, 
place the burden on the Government.  Id. at 1146.  The court further noted that “when a 
statute is silent on the question of affirmative defenses and when the affirmative defense 
does not negate an essential element of the offense, [the courts] must presume that the 
common law rule that places the burden of persuasion on the defendant reflects the intent 
of Congress.”  Id. at 1147 (citing another source). 
 CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that where the defendant’s common-law 
affirmative defense does not negate any element of the charged crime, but is grounded in 
excuse, the defendant bears the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 1145–46.   
 
United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION ONE:  Whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to consider a district 
court’s non-final judgment denying a defendant’s motion to seal pretrial competency 
proceedings and associated materials under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 995.  
ANALYSIS:  The court noted that “three requirements must be met before [an 
appellate court can] exercise collateral order review.”  Id.  First, “the order must . . . 
conclusively determine the disputed question.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Second, the order must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits 
of the action.”  Id. at 995–96 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Third, the order must 
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“be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Id. at 996 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that a collateral order review would 
“conclusively determine[] the disputed question of whether to allow public access to [a 
criminal defendant’s] competency proceedings and related documents.”  Id.  The court 
noted that “whether the competency proceedings and associated materials are unsealed is 
completely separate from the merits of the Government’s case[.]”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court further reasoned that “the issue is . . . an important one” to the 
court, defendant, and Government.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the 
court posited that an “order[] denying motions to seal competency proceedings . . . are 
not effectively unreviewable on appeal.”  Id. at 998.    
CONCLUSION:   The 9th Circuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider a district court’s non-final judgment denying a defendant’s motion to seal 
pretrial competency proceedings and associated materials under the collateral order 
doctrine.  Id. at 995. 
 
QUESTION TWO:  “Whether there is a public right of access to criminal 
competency proceedings.”  Id. at 1000. 
ANALYSIS:  The court noted that there is a “presumed right of access to court 
proceedings and documents under the First Amendment.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court applied the Supreme Court’s experience and logic test “[t]o 
determine whether there is a right of access to a particular kind of hearing.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that, under the “experience prong . . . [courts] 
consider[] whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and 
general public.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court established that it was 
“aware of only one (unpublished) federal court decision discussing whether there is a 
First Amendment right of access to a competency proceeding,” and that it did not find a 
“decision denying open access to competency proceedings.”  Id. at 1000–01.  The court 
then noted that, under the “logic [prong, the court considers] whether public access plays 
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”  Id. at 
1001 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that “[p]ublic access to 
criminal trials and juror selection is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal 
justice system.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court posited that 
“[a]llowing public access to a competency hearing permits the public to view and read 
about the criminal justice process and ensure that the proceedings are conducted in an 
open, objective, and fair manner.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit concluded that because “the experience and logic 
factors [of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment test] are both met” there is a presumed 
public right of access to competency proceedings.  Id. at 1001–02. 
 
United States v. Nielsen, 694 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether a juvenile adjudication for sexual assault counts as a 
“conviction” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a), triggering the Repeat and Dangerous Sex 
Offender Against Minors sentencing enhancement.  Id. at 1037. 
ANALYSIS:  The 9th Circuit first observed that application notes for § 4B1.5(a) 
define a “sex offense conviction” as “any offense” included in 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(A) 
or (B), if the offense was committed against a minor.  Id.  The government argued that 
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the phrase “‘any offense’ in this definition demonstrate the Sentencing Commission’s 
intent to count ‘any’ prior sexual offense against a minor as a conviction, including 
juvenile adjudications.”  Id.  The court, looking to the plain reading of the application 
notes, disagreed and reasoned that the notes were intended to “address which substantive 
offenses count as a ‘sex offense,’ rather than define what constitutes a ‘conviction.’”  Id.  
The Sentencing Guidelines apply to juvenile adjudications when “they say so expressly.”  
Id.  The court stressed that § 4B1.5(a) includes no reference to juvenile adjudications.  Id. 
at 1038.  The court further noted that the “Guidelines do not use the word ‘conviction’ to 
refer to juvenile adjudications.”  Id.  Although “juvenile adjudications qualify as 
predicate convictions under particular federal statutes,” the court emphasized that 
Congress “specifically indicates when it intends for juvenile adjudications to be 
considered convictions, while imposing age and severity limitations on what sorts of 
adjudications may be considered.”  Id.   
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that the defendant’s juvenile adjudication did 
“not constitute a ‘sex offense conviction’” under § 4B1.5(a), and thus, did not trigger the 
Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors sentencing enhancement.  Id. 
 
United States v. United States District Court for Northern Marina Islands, No. 11-
72940, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19134 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2012) 
 QUESTION:  “[W]hether the district court has the authority to direct that the 
United States, its agencies, or its officers sued in their official capacities must appear at 
routine settlement conferences through a high-level official who has full settlement 
authority over the claim in dispute.”  Id. at *14. 
ANALYSIS:  The 9th Circuit found three sources of authority for the district court 
to order the appearance of the federal government at settlement conferences.  Id. at *14–
15.  First, the court observed that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(1) specifies 
that, “if appropriate, the court may require that a party or its representative be present or 
reasonably available by other means to consider possible settlement.”  Id. at *15 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Second, the court noted that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 authorizes the district court to use mandatory settlement conferences and other 
litigation management techniques, “including a requirement that, upon notice by the 
court, representatives of the parties with authority to bind them in settlement discussions 
be present or available by telephone during any settlement conference.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court further noted that cases involving the federal 
government are not exempt from such techniques.  Id. at *15–16.  Third, court posited 
that the district court has “inherent power” over the management of its docket.  Id. at *16.  
The 9th Circuit also rejected the federal government’s assertion that the district court’s 
authority would “interfere with the exclusive authority assigned to the Attorney General 
by Congress to conduct litigation” on its behalf, noting that, “[w]hen the United States 
stands as a party before the court, the authority of the Attorney General is no greater than 
that of any other party.”  Id. at *18–19. 
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that a district court has broad authority to 
compel parties, including the federal government, to participate in mandatory settlement 
conferences.  Id. at *1. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT  
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Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  Whether job transfers for medical treatment constitute a reasonable 
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 1180.  
ANALYSIS:  The court noted that “a reasonable accommodation may include 
reassignment to a vacant position if the employee is qualified for the job and it does not 
impose an undue burden on the employer.”  Id.  More specifically, the court posited that 
transfer accommodations are reasonable where the employee can no longer perform the 
essential functions of the job he or she holds, due to a disability.  Id.  The court then 
noted that the 1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits’ hold that “even when qualified employees are 
able to perform a job’s essential functions, employers may not be relieved of their duty to 
accommodate where accommodations are required to allow equal enjoyment of 
employment privileges and benefits or to pursue therapy or treatment.  Id. at 1181.  The 
court reasoned that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Regulations also 
impose on employers an affirmative duty, beyond providing accommodations that allow 
the employee to perform the essential functions “to meet the [specific] needs of disabled 
workers and to broaden their employment opportunities.  Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 10th Circuit held that “a transfer accommodation for medical 
care or treatment is not per se unreasonable, even if an employee is able to perform the 
essential functions of her job without it” and therefore qualifies as reasonable 
accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 1182. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT  
 
Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2013)2 
QUESTION:  Whether a defendant may obtain post-conviction relief by 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel where, without consulting the defendant, 
counsel for defendant partially concedes guilt at trial in an effort to garner 
credibility in defending other charges.  Id. at *1.   
ANALYSIS:  The 11th Circuit first considered whether Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence precludes a defendant’s counsel from conceding partial guilt as a 
defense strategy.  Id. at *13.  After concluding that it does not, the 11th Circuit 
noted that the 1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits expressly permit defense counsel’s 
concession of guilt as a viable trial strategy.  Id.  The court agreed that the strategy 
is a tactical one and may be used by counsel to argue for a lighter sentence for the 
defendant.  Id.   
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that an admission of guilt by a 
defendant’s counsel did not violate the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at *8. 
 
Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, 701 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION:  “[W]hether a sublease transferred by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Specific reporter pages were not assigned at time of publication; pin cites reflect Lexis page numbers.  
The Lexis cite is: Darden v. United States, No. 10-15640, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2928 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 
2013). 
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enforceable [pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §1821(e)(13)(A)] despite a clause purporting to 
terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank.”  Id. at 917. 
ANALYSIS:  The 11th Circuit began with the plain language of §1821(e)(13)(A) 
and observed that the FDIC may enforce contracts “notwithstanding any provision of the 
contract providing for termination, default, acceleration, or exercise of rights upon, or 
solely by reason of, insolvency or appointment of or the exercise of rights or powers by a 
conservator or receiver.”  Id. at 924.  The court found that the trigger of the termination 
clause “is the exercise of one of the rights of the receiver—the right to succeed to all 
rights [of a failed bank] . . . pursuant to §1821(d)(2)(A)(1).”  Id.  The court reasoned that 
such a reading of the statute “comports with Congress’s stated intent in enacting 
[Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act] FIRREA and its grant of 
broad powers to the FDIC to manage the affairs of failing banks under §1821.”  Id. at 
925.  Accordingly, the FDIC is “acting within its powers when it enforce[s] [a] sublease 
notwithstanding the termination clause.”  Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that “the Termination Clause falls within 
the language of § 1821(e)(13)(A) and is therefore unenforceable against the FDIC as 
receiver of [a failed bank’s assets].”  Id.  
 
Moore v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 708 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2013) 
 QUESTION:  Whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, liquidated damages are 
mandated “after a finding of liability for retaliation, unless excused by proof of 
reasonable good faith of the employer.”  Id. at 1238. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court analyzed the plain text of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and reasoned 
that the first sentence of the statute, which does not mention retaliation, mandates 
liquidated damages when liability for unpaid minimum wages or overtime has been 
found.  Id. at 1241.  The court noted that the second sentence of § 216(b) was “added by 
amendment in 1977,” and that “at the time Congress drafted the second sentence with its 
‘as may be appropriate’ language, it was aware of its existing mandatory liquidated 
damages requirement for minimum wage and overtime claims and the application of a 
reasonable good faith exception to that, and did not choose to do the same in regard to 
retaliation claims.”  Id. at 1241–42. 
 CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that § 216(b) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not require the mandatory imposition of liquidated damages 
when liability for retaliation has been found.  Id. at 1243. 
 
Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012)  
QUESTION:  “Whether a party claiming actual identity theft resulting from a data 
breach has standing to bring suit . . . .”  Id. at 1323.  
ANALYSIS:    The court first found that allegations of identity theft and resulting 
monetary damages “constitute an injury in fact under the law.”  Id.  The 11th Circuit next 
determined that plaintiffs’ injury was fairly traceable to defendant’s actions.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs “became victims of identity theft after the unencrypted laptops containing their 
sensitive information were stolen.”  Id. at 1324.  Finally, the court found that plaintiffs 
had met their burden of showing “that a favorable resolution of the case in their favor 
could redress their alleged injuries.” Id.   
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CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that alleging a health care plan operator 
failed to properly secure information on a company laptop was sufficient to confer 
standing.  Id. at 1329–30.   
 
Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 QUESTION:  Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital 
“modifies . . . previous case law applying the cat’s paw theory and lowers the burden for 
plaintiffs in cases involving the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)].”  
Id. at 1335. 
 ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub 
“defined the circumstances under which an employer could be” subject to liability under 
the “cat’s paw” theory pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”).  Id. at 1335.  The court stressed that 
“the text of the USERRA and the ADEA differ in important respects.”  Id.  In particular, 
the court stated that “USERRA . . . requires that a plaintiff demonstrate discrimination by 
showing that the proscribed bias was a ‘motivating factor’ in the adverse decision.”  Id.  
The court pointed out that “this ‘motivating factor’ causation standard is simply the 
traditional tort law standard of proximate cause . . . .”  Id.  The court then noted that, by 
contrast, the ADEA’s “but-for” causation standard “requires that the proscribed animus 
have a determinative influence on the employer’s decision.”  Id. at 1335–36.  The court 
reasoned that in determining the applicability of the Staub analysis, courts “must be 
careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without 
careful and critical examination.”  Id. at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court noted that “the ADEA requires more than what must ordinarily be proven under an 
analogous Title VII or USERRA action.”  Id.  Accordingly, the court determined that, 
“[b]ecause the ADEA requires a ‘but-for’ link between the discriminatory animus and the 
adverse employment action as opposed to showing that the animus was a ‘motivating 
factor’ in the adverse employment decision, . . . Staub’s ‘proximate causation’ standard 
does not apply to cat’s paw cases involving age discrimination.” Id.   
 CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that “Staub’s ‘proximate causation’ 
standard does not apply to cat's paw cases involving age discrimination.”  Id. at 1336.     
 
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012)  
 QUESTION:  Whether Congress has the authority, pursuant to the Offences Clause, 
“to proscribe drug trafficking in the territorial waters of another nation . . . .”  Id. at 1249.  
ANALYSIS:  The court began by recognizing that word “define” in the Offences 
Clause “is limited by the law of nations.”  Id.  “Offences against the Law of Nations” is 
defined as “violations of customary international law.”  Id.  Drug trafficking, the subject 
of the case, “was not a violation of customary international law at the time of the 
Founding, and . . . is not a violation of customary international law today.”  Id. at 1253–
54.  In addition, “the United States ha[d] not offered . . . any alternative ground upon 
which the Act could be sustained as constitutional.”  Id. at 1258.   
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that “Congress exceeded its power, under 
the Offences Clause, when it proscribed the defendants’ conduct in the territorial waters 
of [another nation].”  Id. at 1258. 
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United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013)3 
QUESTION ONE:  Whether application of Sentencing Commission Amendment 
759, which precludes courts from reducing terms of imprisonment below a minimum of 
an amended guideline range on motions for sentence reductions due to amended 
guideline range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id. at *5–6. 
ANALYSIS:   The 11th Circuit first noted the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits 
“imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assignment by law when the 
act to be punished occurred.”  Id. at *5.  The court further reasoned that the measuring 
point is the time at which the defendant committed the offense.  Id. at *5–6.   
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit concluded that the Amendment did not permit 
the court to undo prior departures or variances from the guidelines and “so long as the 
effect of post-conduct amendments to the guidelines is not to increase a defendant’s 
punishment beyond what it would have been without those amendments,” the imposition 
of punishment is not more severe.  Id. at *6. 
 
QUESTION TWO:  Whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority 
under the Sentencing Reform Act by passing an amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) that 
eliminates a district court’s discretion to lower a sentence below a prisoner’s amended 
guideline range.  Id. at *6–7. 
ANALYSIS:   The court first noted that Congress requires the Sentencing 
Commission to: 1) specify the circumstances under which and the amounts by which 
sentences can be reduced based on retroactive amendments, and; 2) do so in a policy 
statement.  Id. at *9.  The 11th Circuit reasoned that the Commission’s amendment 
prohibits reductions “unless the original sentence had been below the applicable 
guideline range because of a reduction based upon the defendant’s substantial assistance 
to authorities.”  Id. at * 7.  The court opined that, in placing this requirement, the 
Commission indicated the circumstances and amount by which sentences can be reduced.  
Id.  The court determined that, although the Sentencing Reform Act does not allow the 
Sentencing Commission to override a court’s decision to lower a sentence at the original 
proceeding, the amendment to § 1B1.10(b) does not override any earlier sentencing 
decisions by courts, it simply limits new departures and variances.  Id. at *9–10.   
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit concluded that the Sentencing Commission did 
not exceed its statutory authority in amending § 1B1.10(b) to limit a court’s discretion to 
lower a sentence below amended guideline ranges.  Id. at *10.  
 
QUESTION THREE:  Whether, in amending § 1B1.10, “the Sentencing 
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine by failing to comply with 28 
U.S.C. § 994(p)’s report-and-wait procedure and thereby issuing legislative rules without 
Congressional approval and oversight.”  Id. at *11. 
ANALYSIS:   The court first reasoned that the report-and-wait procedure applies 
only to guidelines and not to policy statements.  Id. at *11–12.  The court noted that § 
1B1.10(b)(2) is a policy statement, not a guideline.  Id. at *12.  The court opined that the 
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purpose of the report-and-wait requirement to make the Commission accountable was 
fulfilled because Congress can override any policy statement by statute.  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit determined that the Commission did not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine in amending § 1B1.10.  Id. at *13. 
 
QUESTION FOUR: Whether the Commission violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act by not complying with notice and comment rulemaking requirements.  Id.  
ANALYSIS: The court relied largely on the fact that §1B1.10 is a policy statement, 
not a guideline.  Id. at *14.  The 11th Circuit then noted that Congress only requires that 
guideline changes go through notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, but did not extend the requirement to policy statements.  Id.  The court 
also reasoned that it was of no consequence that this policy statement is binding because 
Congress made the policy statement binding on courts by statute rather than the 
Commission making a rule that is binding.  Id. at *15. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit determined that § 1B1.10, as a policy statement 
made binding by Congress, not the Commission, is not subject to notice and comment 
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. 
 
United States v. Griffin, 696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2012) 
        QUESTION:  Whether a police officer that conducts a Terry stop of an individual and 
asks questions unrelated to the cause of the stop violates the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
1357.   
         ANALYSIS:  The court stated that a police officer can briefly stop a person for 
investigative purposes without violating the Fourth Amendment if the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may take place.  Id. at 1358.  The court stated 
that great deference is given to the judgment of the police officer in whether to conduct a 
Terry stop.  Id. at 1360.  The court then noted that Police questioning unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop that does not extend the duration of the stop does not constitute a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and is not equivalent to a search.  Id. at 1362–64   
         CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that an officer who asks questions unrelated to 
the cause of the stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment unless such questions 
“measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  Id. at 1362. 
 
